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Before: GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, 
Circuit Judges.  
 
                                                                
* One sentencing issue was argued en banc on October 
18, 2017, and will be addressed in a separate opinion. 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Kenneth Douglas appeals his sentence, arguing that the 
District Court incorrectly held him responsible for trafficking 
more than 450 kilograms of cocaine, erroneously applied 
sentencing enhancements for abuse of a position of trust under 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 and obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. 
§ 3C1.1, and failed to appropriately consider the disparity 
between his sentence and those imposed on his co-
conspirators.  For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm 
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the sentence with respect to the drug calculation and reverse 
the obstruction of justice enhancement.1 
 
I 
 
 Douglas participated in a conspiracy to distribute 
cocaine.  The conspiracy began years before he joined it, when 
Tywan Staples, who lived in the San Francisco area, began 
supplying marijuana to his cousin Robert Russell Spence in 
Pittsburgh.  Staples and Spence went from selling small 
amounts of marijuana to shipping four to six kilograms of 
cocaine across the country several times a month.  After law 
enforcement intercepted several packages containing money 
and drugs, the conspirators began using couriers to carry drugs 
and money on commercial flights.  By 2008, six different 
couriers were transporting cocaine out of the Oakland, 
California airport.  After two of the couriers were arrested, the 
conspirators began using San Francisco International Airport 
(“SFIA”) instead.   
                                                                
1 The Panel filed an opinion on February 22, 2017, that 
affirmed the drug calculation, reversed the imposition of the 
obstruction of justice enhancement, and affirmed the abuse of 
position of trust enhancement.  The Court granted the petition 
to rehear the application of the abuse of position of trust 
enhancement, and upon rehearing en banc, the Court en banc 
determined that the enhancement does not apply.  The en banc 
opinion is filed contemporaneously with this opinion.  United 
States v. Douglas, No. 15-1754, --- F.3d --- (3d Cir. _______) 
(en banc).  This Panel opinion essentially reinstates the original 
Panel opinion except for the issue addressed by the Court en 
banc. 
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 Staples, who worked at the “maintenance base” at 
SFIA, knew Douglas, who was an airline mechanic for United 
Airlines.  Douglas had an Airport Operation Authority 
(“AOA”) badge that enabled him to enter the airport terminal 
without being screened at a Transportation Security 
Administration (“TSA”) checkpoint.2  Unlike Douglas, Staples 
did not have the ability to enter the terminal without inspection.  
For that reason, when Douglas asked Staples if he had “any 
way [Douglas] could make some extra money,” Staples invited 
him to join the conspiracy.  Douglas accepted. 
 
 Staples and Douglas facilitated the movement of 
cocaine in a simple way.  Staples would deliver the cocaine to 
Douglas packed in a bag with clothing.  Douglas would then 
smuggle the bag into the terminal and either transfer it to a 
courier once inside the secured area of the terminal, or board 
the plane as a passenger with the drugs. 
 
 Staples testified that Douglas assisted with the 
movement of the cocaine “40 to 50 times,” transporting ten to 
thirteen kilograms of cocaine on each occasion.  App. 102.  
Douglas transported drugs himself on seventeen occasions.  
Unlike the couriers, he was not required to bring cash back to 
California, so as to avoid any risk of being caught, which 
would, in turn, shut down the conspiracy’s San Francisco 
                                                                
 2 Douglas’s supervisor described the way Douglas 
would access the terminal.  To enter the terminal through a 
secured employee entrance, an employee has to use his AOA 
badge as well as place his hand on a biometric scanner.  
However, to leave the terminal, only the AOA badge is 
required.  On a random basis, the TSA would search employees 
entering the terminal. 
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distribution activities.  Staples testified that Douglas was paid 
$5,000 each time that he smuggled cocaine into the airport, and 
another $5,000 each time he delivered a shipment himself.  
 
 Using airline records, the Government identified forty-
six specific flights departing from SFIA between January and 
November of 2009 that were associated with the conspiracy, 
including seventeen flights on which Douglas personally 
transported drugs, sometimes using his employee benefit 
tickets.  These flights included very short round trips that were 
inconsistent with personal travel, and corresponded to phone 
calls among the conspirators, the use of pre-paid credit cards, 
and the timing of deposits into Douglas’s bank account.  
 
 Following an investigation, a grand jury returned an 
indictment against Douglas and twenty-one co-defendants.  
Douglas was charged with conspiracy to distribute and to 
possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of 
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and conspiracy to 
engage in money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1956(h).  Douglas was arrested and released on bail, subject 
to several conditions, including travel restrictions and a 
requirement that he appear for court proceedings.  While 
Douglas was on bail, the Probation Office discovered that he 
had booked a flight to Jamaica without permission.  At his bail 
revocation hearing, Douglas claimed he had mistakenly 
booked a flight for himself while booking a flight for his wife.  
The District Court did not revoke his bail, but modified his 
conditions of release to require him to call probation daily to 
verify his whereabouts. 
 
 Douglas’s trial was scheduled to begin on January 8, 
2014.  He failed to appear for the first day of trial.  The next 
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day, he filed a motion for a continuance claiming that he “was 
receiving medical attention on January 8, 2014 and was unable 
[to be] in court for that reason.”  Supp. App. 47.  In connection 
with the motion, Douglas submitted documents showing that 
he was admitted to the emergency room around 2:00 a.m. on 
January 8, complaining of chest pain.  The records show that 
he was treated with aspirin and intravenous insulin, transported 
via ambulance to an urgent care facility, and had a series of 
tests in both medical facilities.  Douglas’s EKG revealed 
possible heart blockage, and his blood tests indicated he had an 
abnormal white blood cell count, as well as an elevated enzyme 
level that can be indicative of a heart attack.  He received 
instructions for taking eight over-the-counter and prescription 
medications, in addition to the medication he was already 
taking for diabetes.  Douglas was also instructed to schedule 
follow-up testing and appointments with several specialists.  
Douglas was also given a doctor’s note bearing the time 4:12 
p.m. asking that he be excused from court on January 8.   
  
 Based on this evidence, the Government argued that it 
was “possible that [Douglas] went there [at] 2:00 in the 
morning faking this illness, so he wouldn’t have to be here 
today.  It is also possible that that was a legitimate illness.  I 
don’t think that anything in the records tells us one way or the 
other.”  App. 388.  Despite the hospital records, the District 
Court stated that “[t]here’s no solid evidence, at least 
presented, that he was suffering from a medical condition that 
warranted him not to appear.  It’s really sort of ambiguous.”  
App. 390–91.  Expressing concern that Douglas would not 
appear for jury selection the following Monday, the District 
Court revoked his bail. 
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 On January 13, 2014, a jury was selected for the joint 
trial of Douglas and a codefendant, but the next day, Douglas’s 
attorney withdrew, Douglas’s case was severed, and his trial 
was adjourned.  His bail was reinstated but modified to require 
home detention and electronic monitoring. 
 
 Douglas obtained new counsel and later waived his 
right to a jury trial.  At the bench trial, the Government offered 
testimony from several coconspirators, law enforcement 
officers, and a United Airlines supervisor.  The Government 
also presented documents corroborating their testimony.  
Following the trial, the District Court convicted Douglas of 
both charges. 
 
 Before sentencing, the Probation Office submitted a 
pre-sentence investigation report (“PSR”) recommending that 
Douglas be held responsible for 450 kilograms of cocaine, 
resulting in a base offense level of 38.  Applying the grouping 
rules, the PSR recommended a two-level enhancement 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B), because Douglas had 
been convicted of conspiracy to engage in money laundering.  
The PSR also recommended a two-level enhancement for 
abuse of a position of trust, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, and 
a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, for a total offense level of 44, which is 
treated as a 43, the maximum offense level under the 
Guidelines, which corresponds to a Guidelines sentence of life 
imprisonment.  Douglas objected to the drug quantity as well 
as to the upward adjustments for obstruction of justice and 
abuse of a position of trust. 
 
 At sentencing, the District Court overruled Douglas’s 
objections, citing Staples’s testimony that Douglas smuggled 
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between 10 and 13 kilograms of cocaine between 40 and 50 
times, and concluding based on the number of trips that “there 
is ample evidence to show that [he] was responsible for more 
than 450 kilograms of cocaine.”  Supp. App. 236, 393, 403 
(noting that his involvement was not an “anomaly”), 411 
(observing that the evidence against him was 
“overwhelming”).   
 
 The District Court also noted the presence of 
“aggravating factors,” including that Douglas “use[d] [his] 
position of trust with the airlines and, more specifically, [his] 
level of security clearance to aid [him] in being part of th[e] 
conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and the amount 
of drugs that . . . [was] transported with [his] assistance was 
enormous.”  App. 411.  As to the obstruction of justice 
enhancement, the District Court relied upon Douglas’s failure 
to appear on the first day of trial, but made no findings beyond 
those it made in its tentative findings, in which it deemed the 
objection to the enhancement to be “without merit.”  Supp. 
App. 237-47.   
 
 After determining the total offense level to be 43, the 
District Court noted that it had “gone through all of the 3553 
factors[,] [ ] looked at them all to determine a sentence that 
[wa]s sufficient but not greater than necessary,” decided to 
vary downward from the Guidelines sentence of life 
imprisonment, App. 411-12, and imposed a sentence of 240 
months’ imprisonment for each count, to be served 
concurrently, followed by five years of supervised release.  
Douglas appeals.   
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II3 
 
 We review sentences for both procedural and 
substantive reasonableness.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 
558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).   At the first stage, in which 
we review for procedural reasonableness, we seek to 
 
ensure that the district court committed no 
significant procedural error, such as failing to 
calculate (or improperly calculating) the 
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as 
mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) 
factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly 
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain 
the chosen sentence—including an explanation 
for any deviation from the Guidelines range. 
 
Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 
38, 50-51 (2007)).  If the district court’s sentencing procedure 
                                                                
 3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a).  We exercise plenary review over the 
construction of the Sentencing Guidelines themselves.  United 
States v. Greene, 212 F.3d 758, 760 (3d Cir. 2000).  We review 
the factual determinations underlying a sentence for clear error.  
“A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when, although there is 
evidence to support it, the reviewing body on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed.”  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 
556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (alterations and citations 
omitted).   
 
10 
 
“passes muster, we then, at stage two, consider its substantive 
reasonableness,” based on the totality of the circumstances.  
Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.  Absent significant procedural error, 
“we will affirm [the sentence as substantively reasonable] 
unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the 
same sentence on th[e] particular defendant for the reasons the 
district court provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568. 
 
 We will first review Douglas’s challenge to the drug 
quantity calculation and then address his argument concerning 
the Guidelines enhancement. 
 
A 
 
 At sentencing, “the government bears the burden of 
[proving drug quantity] by a preponderance of the evidence.”  
United States v. Paulino, 996 F.2d 1541, 1545 (3d Cir. 1993).  
While “some degree of estimation must be permitted,” United 
States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 998 (3d Cir. 1992), the district 
court must satisfy itself that the evidentiary basis for its 
estimate has sufficient indicia of reliability.  See United States 
v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1993) (drug quantity estimation 
based solely on grand jury testimony of single drug-addicted 
witness who had contradicted himself was not sufficiently 
reliable).  “‘Indicia of reliability may come 
from . . . corroboration by or consistency with other evidence . 
. . .’”  United States v. Freeman, 763 F.3d 322, 337 (3d Cir. 
2014) (quoting United States v. Smith, 674 F.3d 722, 732 (7th 
Cir. 2012)).  
 
 The evidence supports the District Court’s factual 
determination that Douglas was responsible for more than 450 
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kilograms of cocaine.  Staples testified that Douglas smuggled 
“[10] or 13 kilograms” of cocaine through SFIA “40 to 50 
times,” App. 102, which totals between 400 and 650 kilograms 
of cocaine.  Staples knew the amount of drugs because he 
provided Douglas with the cocaine, and nothing in the record 
suggests that his perception or memory was impaired in any 
way or that he provided inconsistent information on this topic.  
Cf. Miele, 989 F.2d at 666.   
 
 Furthermore, the Government corroborated Staples’s 
testimony with flight records, telephone toll records, and bank 
deposits.  It identified forty-six flights taken out of SFIA by 
various drug couriers, including Douglas, all of which 
depended on Douglas to smuggle drugs past security into the 
terminal.  Even if each flight involved only the minimum 10 
kilograms of cocaine, this would justify an estimate of over 450 
kilograms.  The fact that the number of flights was established 
through circumstantial evidence does not mean that reliance on 
it was error.  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 
175 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The quantity of drugs attributable to a 
defendant is a question of fact.  As such, if the evidence—
direct or circumstantial—supports a district court's 
preponderance determination as to drug quantity, we must 
sustain that finding.”). 
 
   Furthermore, the fact that Douglas used employee 
benefit tickets for some of the trips does not undermine the 
conclusion that the trips were taken for the conspiracy.  Staples 
testified that Douglas sometimes used his benefits for these 
flights, despite the fact that doing so was riskier because he 
might be required to wait longer to board a flight.   
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 Douglas’s argument that cash deposits into his bank 
account could have come from gambling is also unavailing.  
The regularity of the deposits and the correspondence between 
the dates of the deposits and the suspicious flights provides a 
reasonable basis to infer that the flights were related to the 
conspiracy.4 
 
 In sum, Staples’s testimony and the documentary 
evidence provide ample support for the determination that 
Douglas was responsible for more than 450 kilograms of 
cocaine, and the District Court did not err in so finding.    
 
B 
 
 We next examine the application of the § 3C1.1 
enhancement for obstruction of justice.  Section 3C1.1 
provides a two-level increase in the offense level where “the 
defendant willfully obstructed or impeded . . . the 
administration of justice with respect to the . . . prosecution . . 
. of the instant offense of conviction, and [ ] the obstructive 
conduct related to  . . . the defendant’s offense of conviction . . 
                                                                
 4 Douglas attempts to argue in the alternative that the 
District Court should have calculated the total drug quantity 
based only on the seventeen flights he personally took because 
the Government presented more specific evidence concerning 
its identification of these flights.  While these flights were 
substantiated in more detail at trial, Staples’s testimony, 
combined with the flight records for the other drug couriers and 
the deposits into Douglas’s bank account, provide a sufficient 
basis for the District Court to conclude that Douglas was 
involved in smuggling drugs approximately forty-six, rather 
than seventeen, times.  
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. .”  U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.  “[W]illfully failing to appear, as 
ordered, for a judicial proceeding” is covered conduct.  Id. 
§ 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(E).  “Willfully” in this context means 
“deliberately or intentionally; in other words, not negligently, 
inadvertently, or accidentally.”  United States v. Jenkins, 275 
F.3d 283, 287 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The word “willful . . .  when used in a criminal 
statute . . .  generally means an act done with a bad purpose.”  
United States v. Belletiere, 971 F.2d 961, 965 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The government bears the 
burden of proving that the defendant “willfully obstructed or 
impeded . . . the administration of justice” by a preponderance 
of the evidence.  Id. 
 
 The District Court adopted the PSR’s recommendation 
to impose the obstruction of justice enhancement based on 
Douglas’s “fail[ure] to appear for trial on January 8, 2014.”  
PSR ¶ 27.  During the hearing addressing his failure to appear, 
the District Court was provided with medical records and 
informed that Douglas had been in the hospital.  The District 
Court considered the records and arguments and said that 
“[t]here’s no solid evidence, at least presented, that he was 
suffering from a medical condition that warranted him not to 
appear.  It’s really sort of ambiguous.”  App. 390-91.  As a 
result, the District Court concluded that there was a 
“substantial risk” that Douglas would not appear at trial and 
thereby disrupt the administration of justice.  App. 391.  In 
connection with sentencing, the District Court relied on these 
facts to impose the § 3C1.1 enhancement, making no additional 
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factual findings on the subject, and declared the objection to 
the enhancement to be “without merit.” 5  Supp. App. 236. 
   Douglas asserts that the District Court erred in 
imposing the enhancement.  He points out that he provided a 
medical explanation for his absence from trial, notes that the 
District Court made no findings that he willfully failed to 
appear for trial, and argues that the subsequent reinstatement 
of his bail and the granting of travel requests shows that the 
District Court “did not find that the Appellant’s failure to 
appear on his jury selection date was willful.”  Appellant’s Br. 
at 35. 
 
 While there is no question that Douglas was aware of 
the date of trial and he intentionally did not appear in court, the 
record does not show that he willfully failed to appear.  
Douglas provided medical documentation that explained his 
absence.  These records show that he awoke the morning of 
                                                                
 5 At the sentencing hearing, the District Court requested 
clarification for the basis on which the Government sought the 
enhancement, asking that it “[b]e more specific with regard to 
obstruction” and whether its basis was “[f]ailure to appear for 
court.”  App. 407.  The Government said it was but also listed 
several allegedly false statements Douglas made that caused 
law enforcement to waste investigatory effort.  Douglas’s 
attorney then stated that he had been under the impression the 
obstruction of justice enhancement “was predicated on failure 
to appear for trial.”  App. 408.  The Government repeated that 
there were multiple reasons but that “[b]oth the probation 
office and [the Court] already ruled on them.”  App. 408-09.  
The District Court then stated “I agree. That matter has already 
been thoroughly covered.  The Court has ruled on it.”  App. 
409. 
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trial with chest pain and went to the emergency room at 2:00 
a.m., underwent tests showing a possible heart blockage, 
abnormal white blood cell count, and elevated heart enzyme 
levels, and was treated with insulin and aspirin.  His complaints 
were taken seriously, as reflected by the fact that he was 
transported by ambulance to the hospital’s urgent care facility 
for tests.  Most significantly, the documentation included a 
page entitled “verification of treatment” signed by a medical 
doctor at 4:12 p.m. on January 8, 2014, which stated that 
Douglas received care and requested that the court “[p]lease 
excuse Mr. Douglas’ absence from court today.”  Given this 
documentation, we are unable to determine why the District 
Court viewed his medical excuse skeptically or described the 
documentation as “ambiguous.”  App. 391.   
 
 Moreover, the Government bears the burden of proof 
and offered no evidence to show Douglas’s conduct was 
willful, in the sense that Douglas deliberately schemed not to 
appear in court by feigning illness.  See United States v. 
Batista, 483 F.3d 193, 195-97 (3d Cir. 2007) (five mental 
health evaluations showed defendant was feigning a mental 
illness to avoid being found competent).  In fact, during the bail 
review hearing the Government stated it was “possible that he 
went to the [hospital] faking this illness, so he would not have 
to be here.  It is also possible that that was a legitimate illness.  
I don’t think that anything in the records tell us one way or the 
other.”  App.  388.  The Government therefore viewed the 
record as being in equipoise.  This is not proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Douglas willfully failed to 
appear.  Absent such proof from the Government showing 
willfulness, and in light of the medical documentation 
presented indicating a lack of willfulness, the application of a 
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§ 3C1.1 enhancement was improper.6   
 By improperly applying the obstruction of justice 
enhancement, the District Court did not accurately calculate 
Douglas’s Guidelines range.  See United States v. Wright, 642 
F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that the application of 
sentence enhancements is used in calculating a defendant’s 
Guidelines range).  Failure to make a “correct computation of 
                                                                
 6 Because we will remand for resentencing due to the 
erroneous application of the enhancement (and the Court en 
banc remands because the enhancement under § 3B1.3 does 
not apply), we need not address the substantive reasonableness 
of the sentence.  United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 
(3d Cir. 2010).  We do note, however, that with respect to 
substantive reasonableness, Douglas argued only that the 
District Court did not consider § 3553(a)(6)’s mandate that 
courts avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among 
codefendants.  He asserts that his 240-month sentence is 
excessive in comparison with his coconspirators who he claims 
held managerial roles and participated in the conspiracy for a 
longer time.  Putting aside the fact that Douglas was a lynchpin 
of the conspiracy’s San Francisco activities and that he played 
a more significant role than other conspirators, and thus he 
does not share “exactly parallel[ ]” circumstances with them, 
United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 161 n.7 (3d Cir. 2008), 
his parity complaint would not entitle him to any relief.  
“Congress’s primary goal in enacting § 3553(a)(6) was to 
promote national uniformity in sentencing rather than 
uniformity among co-defendants in the same case.”  United 
States v. Parker, 462 F.3d 273, 277 (3d Cir. 2006).  As a result, 
Douglas “cannot rely upon § 3553(a)(6) to seek a reduced 
sentence” based on alleged disparity between his sentence and 
those imposed on his co-defendants.  Id.    
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the Guidelines range” constitutes procedural error.  Id. (citing 
United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008)).   
 
 Here, Douglas’s total offense level with the 
enhancement was 43, which corresponds to life imprisonment.  
Without the § 3C1.1 enhancement, Douglas’s total offense 
level corresponds to 360 months to life imprisonment.7  
Ultimately, the District Court applied a downward variance 
and imposed a sentence of 240 months.  While the District 
Court may still have imposed a sentence of 240 months absent 
the § 3C1.1 enhancement, we cannot be sure.  See, e.g., 
Vazquez-Lebron, 582 F.3d at 446 (“[W]e cannot be sure that 
the district court would have imposed the same sentence if not 
for the error.”); Langford, 516 F.3d at 219 (“[This] is not that 
rare case where we can be sure that an erroneous Guidelines 
calculation did not affect the sentencing process and the 
sentence ultimately imposed.”); see also Molina-Martinez v. 
United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016) (“When a 
defendant is sentenced under an incorrect Guidelines range—
whether or not the defendant’s ultimate sentence falls within 
the correct range—the error itself can, and most often will, be 
sufficient to show a reasonable probability of a different 
outcome absent the error.”).  We will therefore reverse the 
application of the § 3C1.1 enhancement and remand for 
resentencing. 
 
III 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s conclusion regarding drug quantity, reverse the 
                                                                
7 Without the § 3B1.3 enhancement, Douglas’s total 
offense level corresponds to 324 to 405 months’ imprisonment. 
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enhancement for obstruction of justice, and remand for 
resentencing. 
